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ABSTRACT
In cyber-human-medical environments, coordinating supervisory medical sys-
tems and medical staff to perform treatment in accordance with best practice
is essential for patient safety. However, the dynamics of patient conditions
and the non-deterministic nature of potential side effects of treatment pose
significant challenges. This work covers my contribution to one such sys-
tem in development of its low complexity workflow which enhances situation
awareness and in the design and implementation of it fault tolerance.
In the first part of this document, we cover a validation protocol to en-
force the correct execution sequence of treatments, preconditions validation,
side effects monitoring and checking expected responses based on patho-
physiological models. The proposed protocol organizes the medical infor-
mation concisely and comprehensively to help medical staff validate treat-
ments.The proposed protocol dynamically adapts to the patient conditions
and side effects of treatments. A cardiac arrest scenario is used as a case
study to verify the safety properties of the proposed protocol.
In the second part of this document, we describe the integration of some well
understood fault tolerance strategies in context of safety critical systems.
We list out the requirements of our system and explore the traditional Ac-
tive/Standby in context of certain guiding design principles to fit our specific
requirement. Like any software engineering project, we design test suites to
ensure QOS1. We go a step further and try to make this design verifiable
using model checking tools like UPPAAL to demonstrate the correctness of
our system architecture under conditions of normal operation and failure.
1Quality of Service
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Improving the safety and efficacy of healthcare infrastructure is an important
issue for cyber-physical medical systems. Statistics indicate that the fraction
of preventable medical errors is highest in the ICU when compared to other
hospital units[1, 2]. Many preventable medical errors are result from concur-
rent and uncoordinated treatment actions leading to unintended deviations
from the best practice medical guidelines. This is primarily because medical
staff are under tremendous pressure and overloaded by the great amount of
unorganized information[3]. In order to reduce preventable medical errors,
treatment validation is an important aspect. In the first part of this work, we
focus on reducing preventable medical errors by validating treatments and
monitoring patient’s physiological responses based on the pathophysiologi-
cal models[4, 5]. Validation includes checking preconditions of the treatment,
monitoring potential side effects, and checking physiological responses.
On the whole, there is motivation to develop a comprehensive situation
awareness enhancement system that is central to the clinical production en-
vironment which aids doctors in reducing preventable medical errors. The
Cyber−Physical Systems group at University of Illinois, Urbana−Champaign
headed by Prof. Lui Sha, which I am part of, are working on one such project.
The Resuscitation System1 aims at improving patient care by introducing hu-
man in the loop automation. Introduction of automation in this space requires
a certain reliability of the system. This was our motivation in designing a
Fault Tolerance Manager that ensures reliable operation of the system2. My
thesis research deals primarily with the design and implementation of the
fault tolerance manager.
1The project in question
2With great power comes great responsibility
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1.1 Cardiac Resuscitation System: Overview
1.1.1 Main UI
The MainUI acts as a integrated situation awareness display that is primarily
operated by the physicians enabling them to:
• Get information on important patient vitals giving doctors a holistic
idea of patient state.
• Get detailed visualization of actions taken till now as well as logging.
• Get risk oriented display which provides a prioritized display of infor-
mation based on the risk to the patient.
• Clustering information based on organ systems.
1.1.2 Workflow Manager(WM)
The workflow manager drives the user interface to help physicians follow the
resuscitation treatment guidelines and prevent safety hazards. In addition,
when patient adverse events occur, Workflow manager will highlight the next
steps to be taken[6].
1.1.3 Medical Order Manager(MOM)
The Medical order manager is the primary input device operated by the
nurses. It automates the process of data input and eases the ordering of
different actions issued by the nurse during patient care.
1.1.4 Fault Tolerance Manager(FM)
An auxiliary manager that handles distributed fault tolerance strategies and
enables correct and continuous operation of above three components.3
3The Main UI, MOM & WM are pre-existing software components that were indepen-
dently developed by members of my research group that I helped improve. My primary
contribution is towards the Fault Tolerance Manager.
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1.2 Cardiac Resuscitation System: Requirements
To enable full potential, our research group built the Resuscitation System
for enhancing situation awareness in collaboration with Carle Foundation and
the MDPNP team heralded by the Massachusetts General Hospital(MGH).
The Resuscitation System has potential to be generalized to any organ system
model. This system is driven by the workflow that was described about in
the previous section.
Such systems need to meet some important requirements:
• Distributed
• Realtime
• Safety Critical
We will touch on each of these aspects before moving on to the later part
of my work which involves designing a fault tolerance strategy for the sys-
tem enabling it to become robust and deploy-able in real world life critical
situations.
1.2.1 Distributed Requirement
A useful summary of distributed computing concerns is included in Deutsch’s
Eight Fallacies of Distributed Computing[7]. All of these are useful to consider
in realtime system design; each is a departure point for essential design and
implementation concerns:
• The network is reliable
• Latency is zero
• Bandwidth is infinite
• The network is secure
• Topology doesn’t change
• There is one administrator
• Transport cost is zero
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• The network is homogeneous
In our production environment, our system is designed to enhance situation
awareness of physicians during cardiac resuscitation. In such an environment,
we can realize how network reliability and latency are critical components
and fundamental requirements. Two such scenarios are elucidated below:
• To maintain patient privacy in compliance with HIPAA, it is essential
that all communication with in the system are secure.
• In our fault tolerance strategy, we deploy the active standby principle
which involves cut over to a backup system and introducing replicas.
This incurs partial topology changes in the system.
1.2.2 Realtime Requirement
A real-time system is a system in which the timeliness of operation comple-
tion is a part of the functional requirements and correctness measure of the
system. In reality, nearly all systems might be considered ’soft’ real-time, in
that there are usually unspoken requirements/expectations for the timeliness
of operations. We reserve the realtime term, for systems which are incorrect
when time constraints are not met. Note that many of the concerns sum-
marized in the fallacies above intersect with timeliness. In our system where
latency and failure are real and non-trivial factors, the explicit management
of computing and communication resources to effect timeliness and other de-
sign requirements becomes more important, and the separation of these two
dimensions becomes important. Consider the following scenario:
• During the operation of the Medical Order Manager and MainUI, mes-
saging latencies can cause incorrect logging of orders and risk the pa-
tient healthcare. Hence messaging must follow strict ordering and time
constraints.
1.2.3 Safety Critical Requirement
Safety-critical systems are those systems whose failure could result in loss
of life, significant property damage, or damage to the environment. There
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are many well known examples in application areas such as medical devices,
aircraft flight control, weapons, and nuclear systems. The Boeing 777 is de-
scribed by Boeing as one of the most technologically advanced airplane in
the world. Many different technologies have contributed to the aircraft in-
cluding safety-critical computer systems. There are six primary flat-panel
displays and several other smaller displays in the cockpit. The aircraft has
several major computerized systems to aid the pilot including flight man-
agement and enhanced ground proximity warning. Much of the traditional
mechanical and hydraulic equipment is obviated by the use of a fly-by-wire
control system. Such systems require specific verifiable design requirements
and fault tolerance strategies. The field of medicine is no different. Comput-
ers are used in medicine far more widely than most people realize. The idea
of using a microprocessor to control an insulin pump is quite well known.
The fact that a pacemaker is largely a computer is less well known. The ex-
tensive use of computers in surgical procedures is almost unknown except by
specialists. Computerized equipment is making inroads in procedures such
as hip replacement, spinal surgery, and ophthalmic surgery. In all three of
these cases, computer controlled robotic devices are replacing the surgeons
traditional tools, and providing substantial benefits to patients. In our the
cardiac resuscitation project, we take this a step further. We make computers
human centric, aiding physician make decisions and avoid preventable med-
ical errors which puts the patient’s life is at risk. Hence correct, robust and
fault tolerant operation becomes the highest priority.
1.2.4 Composition of Realtime and Distributed
Listed below are some general guiding principles when dealing with such
composite systems.
• Explicit timeliness requirements: Representing the time constraints ex-
plicitly in the design and implementations, and detecting and recover-
ing from failures.
• Time synchronization: Requirements and mechanisms for achieving clock
synchrony. Many applications require only NTP.
• Synchrony requirements: This is connected to clock synchrony, but not
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identical. Emphasis on partial event ordering.
• Design patterns for the requirements.
• Middleware: Encoding the distributed aspects of the system. Examples
include Real-Time CORBA.
• Time Constraints: Documentation, measurement and enforcement of
time constraints in the system.
• Partial Failure: A real-time system typically has reliability require-
ments. One of the unique aspects of distributed systems is the potential
for whole classes of failures called ’partial’ failures, due either to true
crash/communications failures or timeliness errors that must be treated
as failures.
• RTOS: Working with real time operating systems.
In the next chapter we go over the design of the Workflow Manager’s
Treatment Validation protocol[6]4 as well as the Fault Tolerance Manager
with these above mentioned aspects in mind. My main contribution and
focus has been towards the Fault Tolerance Manager. My first part of the
contribution was towards the Workflow Manager. This was much more as a
role to ramp me up to understand all the components of the system and its
design complexity. I next focused on designing and implementing the Fault
Tolerance Manager for the resuscitation system.
4This work was my initiation into the team and I worked with PHD Candidate
Po−Liang Wu on this
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CHAPTER 2
WORKFLOW MANAGER
2.1 Objective
In cyber-physical-human medical environments, coordinating supervisory sys-
tems and medical staff to perform treatments in accordance with best practice
is essential for patient safety. However, the dynamics of patient conditions
and the non-deterministic nature of potential side effects of treatments pose
significant challenges. We model the system from previously and currently
researched systems[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and the controller design derived from
them is presented. We propose a validation protocol to enforce the correct
execution sequence of performing treatment, regarding preconditions vali-
dation, side effects monitoring, and expected responses checking based on
the pathophysiological models. The proposed protocol organizes the medi-
cal information concisely and comprehensively to help medical staff validate
treatments. Therefore, the proposed protocol dynamically adapts to the pa-
tient conditions and side effects of treatments. The protocol is only advisory
and can be overridden by the physician. During such an override the work-
flow manger readjusts the protocol to fit in the new requirements or overrides
specified by the medical personnel. A cardiac arrest scenario is used as a case
study to verify the safety and correctness properties of the proposed protocol.
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2.2 Controller Design
Here is a hierarchical design of our preexisting controller[5, 4, 14, 15] on
which the algorithm is designed to work:
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2.2.1 Resuscitation Workflow Algorithm
The following pseudocodes outline the algorithms involved in the
treatment validation protocol:
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2.2.2 Protocol Design
• TPC Tree1[6] construction phase
The system receives a treatment from the medical staff and starts to
build a TPC tree in a breath-first manner. The system checks the pre-
conditions of the received treatment. If any precondition is not satisfied
or must be checked by the medical staff, the system sends the tree to the
medical staff and requests them to check the preconditions and spec-
ify the corrective treatments, as shown in the line 7-19 2 of Algorithm
III.1. After getting the input from the medical staff, the system checks
1Treatment Precondition and Correction - Formal name for the data structure used to
handle treatment validation
2Discussed in the previous subsection
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if each unsatisfied precondition has a corresponding corrective treat-
ment. If the corrective treatments are incomplete, an exception is sent
to the medical staff, as shown in the line 21-24 of Algorithm III.1. The
system then adds the corrective treatments as child nodes to the TPC
tree. Since the corrective treatments may introduce a new set of pre-
conditions, the system checks the preconditions and expands the tree.
If there are no further preconditions to check or all the preconditions
are satisfied, TPC tree is sent to the medical staff for approval. If the
medical staff approves the TPC tree, the system enters the execution
and monitoring phase.
• Execution and monitoring phase
The system executes the treatments in the TPC tree in a post order.
In order to keep track of all the ongoing treatments, the system main-
tains an executing treatment list. Since patient conditions dynamically
change, the system checks the preconditions of the treatment again be-
fore performing it. If the preconditions are satisfied, the system inserts
the treatment into the executing list and requests the medical devices
to perform the treatment. The system needs to check the expected re-
sponse after a time interval, specified by the medical staff, as shown
in the line 8-15 of Algorithm III.2. The details of checking expected
responses will be explained in the next phase. In addition, the system
periodically monitors or requests the medical to check the potential
side effects of the treatments in the executing list. The side effects may
lead to the following situations:
1. The side effects of a treatment interfere the other ongoing treat-
ments. Specifically, the side effects cause the patients physiological
measurements changing in an opposite direction to the expected
responses of other treatments.
2. The side effects invalidate the previously satisfied preconditions
in the TPC tree.
In both cases, the system will highlight the interfered treatments and
the corresponding preconditions in the TPC tree and send an exception
to the medical staff, as shown in the line 22-25 of Algorithm III.2. The
medical staff can adjust the existing treatments, such as increasing or
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decreasing the drug dosage, or specifying alternative treatments. The
system then updates the tree, as described in the previous phase. After
the system informs the side effects to the medical staff and updates
the TPC tree with their approval, the system restarts the post order
execution.
• Checking expected responses phase
As explained in the previous phases, the system must check patients
conditions against the expected responses of the treatment when the
timer fires. If the patient conditions are as expected, the system removes
the corresponding treatment node from the TPC tree and executes the
next treatments based on the post order of the TPC tree. If the patient
conditions do not improve as expected, the system highlights the un-
successful preconditions and the corresponding corrective treatments
on the TPC tree for the medical staff. The medical staff can specify an
alternative corrective treatment, and the system updates the TPC tree
accordingly and restarts the post order execution.
By following the above procedures, the system preforms the treatments
and corrects the preconditions in a bottom-up manner. Even if the side
effects adversely affect other treatments or invalidate the preconditions,
the system is capable of updating the TPC tree and let medical staff
change the treatments.
2.3 Case Study
Cardiac arrest is the abrupt loss of heart function and can lead to death
within minutes. The American Heart Association (AHA) provided resuscita-
tion guidelines for the urgent treatment of cardiac arrest [16]. The general
procedures of resuscitation consist of the following steps:
1. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR): The medical staff perform CPR
for at least two minutes. In the mean time, other medical staff try to
access intravenous vein (IV therapy) and inject drugs.
2. Check heart rhythm: The medical staff check the heart rhythm. If the
rhythm is non-shockable, the medical staff should keep performing CPR
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and giving drugs, such as vasopressin and epinephrine. If the rhythm
is shockable, they proceed to the defibrillator step.
3. De-fibrillation: If the medical staff determine the heart rhythm is a
shockable one, they should activate a defibrillator to deliver electrical
energy to the heart to regulate the heart rhythm. If the patients heart
rhythm is still abnormal, the medical staff should perform CPR again
(back to step 1). Furthermore, the side effects of the treatments may
cause adverse interactions. Therefore, the medical staff should closely
monitor the patients conditions and preform alternative treatments if
the side effects occur.
2.4 Verification
We model the proposed protocol in UPPAAL[17, 18]. The system consists
of the following models: user interface, validation protocol, side effect moni-
tor, EKG monitor, defibrillator, IV Pump, blood pH monitor, and urine flow
rate sensor. The models communicate using UPPAAL synchronization chan-
nels and shared variables. The user interface models follows the three step
resuscitation procedure and contains a list of predefined preconditions and
treatments. The medical devices send the patients physiological measure-
ments, which are modeled as non-deterministic transitions, to the validation
protocol. In addition, the medical devices also receive the treatment requests
from the protocol and change the states accordingly.
The evaluation environment is shown in 2.1
The medical safety properties(tabulated above) capture the safety require-
ments of the resuscitation scenario, which are given by the medical staff. The
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Model Checker UPPAAL 4.0.13
Processor Intel I7
RAM 4 GB
Parameters Number of hierarchical layers
and queue size
Metrics State space consumed, Verifi-
cation time
Table 2.1: Evaluation environment
Verified Properties
Safety
P1: Defibrillator is activated only if the EKG rhythm is
a shockable one and airway and breathing are normal
P2: Epinephrine is injected only if the blood PH value
is larger than 7.4 and urine flow rate is higher than 12
mL/s
P3: Sodium bicarbonate is injected only if calcium chlo-
ride is not currently being injected.
P4: If epinephrine does induce a shockable, the TPC
tree is updated with a new treatment node for injecting
vassopressin
Protocol
P5: There are no deadlock in the system
P6: A treatment is performed if and only if all its pre-
conditions are satisfied
P7: If side effect does not occur, the root node of the
TPC tree is added to the execution list
P8: If the side effects invalidate a precondition, the TPC
tree is updated and well formed
Table 2.2: Verified properties of the resuscitation scenario
protocol properties guarantee the correctness of the proposed protocol.
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CHAPTER 3
FAULT TOLERANCE MANAGER
The following section outlines our primary work in designing and implement-
ing the Fault Tolerance Manager for the Resuscitation Project.
3.1 Introduction
Complex safety critical systems currently being designed and built are often
difficult multi-disciplinary undertakings. In order to ensure that these sys-
tems perform as specified, even under extreme conditions, it is important
to have a fault tolerant computing system. A number of recent trends, such
as harsh environments, novice users, larger and more complex systems, and
downtime costs etc. have accelerated interest in making general purpose com-
puter systems fault tolerant. The primary goals of fault tolerance are to avoid
downtime and to ensure correct operation even in the presence of faults. Sys-
tem performance, minimally defined to be the number of results per unit time
times the uninterrupted length of time of correct processing, should not be
compromised. In real systems, however, price/performance trade-offs must
be made; fault tolerance features will incur some costs in hardware, in per-
formance, or both. Fault-tolerant computing can hence be loosely defined as
the correct execution of a specified algorithm in the presence of defects. The
effect of defects can be overcome through the use of temporal redundancy
(repeated calculations) or spatial redundancy (extra hardware or software).
These systems are usually classified as either highly reliable or highly avail-
able. As in all system design, the system goals and specifications constrain
the design space and consequently the design techniques that may be used.
At the highest level of specification, fault tolerant systems are categorized as
either highly available or highly reliable.
• Availability A(t): The availability of a system as a function of time is
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the probability that the system is operational at any instant of time t.
The limiting availability is the expected proportion of the time that the
system is available to run useful computations. Activities such as pre-
ventive maintenance and repair reduce the time the system is available
to the user.
• Reliability R(t): The reliability of a system as a function of time is
the conditional probability that the system has survived the interval
[0, t], given that it was operational at time t = 0. Reliability is used
to describe systems in which (1) repair cannot take place or is too
costly (e.g., a satellite computer); or (2) the computer is serving a
critical function and cannot be lost even for the duration of a repair
(e.g., a flight computer on board an aircraft, or the control of a power
distribution network).
Availability is frequently used as a figure of merit in systems for which service
can be delayed or denied for short periods without serious consequences. For
a system in which downtime costs tens of thousands of dollars per minute(e.g.
airline reservation system) an increase of only .1% availability makes a sub-
stantial difference. In general, highly available systems are easier to build than
highly reliable systems because of the more stringent requirements imposed
by the reliability definition. Our emphasis in incorporating fault tolerance
into the resuscitation project is exactly directed to the safety and life critical
aspects of the system and we are focused on building a reliable architecture.
In our system, reliability takes way more precedence than availability.
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3.1.1 Background
To understand our approach lets first discuss the commonly used terms Fail-
ures,Faults and Errors.
1. Classification based on state of system.
• Failure: Changes in hardware that produce unacceptable results
or behaviors leading to requirement violations.
• Fault: Erroneous perceived state of hardware or software result-
ing from failures of components, physical interference from the
environment, operator error, or incorrect design.
• Error: Manifestation of a fault within a program or data structure.
The error may occur some distance from the fault site. Could be
by design.
2. Temporal classification applicable to each of above
• Permanent: Describes a failure, fault, or error that is continuous
and stable. In hardware, permanent failure reflects an irreversible
physical change. The word ’hard’ is used interchangeably with the
word permanent.
• Intermittent: Describes a fault or error that is only occasionally
present due to unstable hardware or varying hardware or software
states(e.g. as a function of load or activity).
• Transient: Describes a fault or error resulting from temporary en-
vironmental conditions. The word ’soft’ is used interchangeably
with transient.Transient faults and intermittent faults are the ma-
jor source of system errors. The distinguishment between these two
types of faults are ability of repair. We consider transient faults
are not repairable, and intermittent ones as repairable. The man-
ifestations of transient and intermittent faults and of incorrect
hardware or software design are much more difficult to determine
than permanent faults
.
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Lets address these one at the time.
• In our system, errors typically would lead to incorrect medical infor-
mation being propagated. Main UI described in 1.1.1 is an integrated
situation awareness display that the doctors will rely on to make diag-
nosis. The whole point of the system is to reduce preventable medical
errors caused by physicians having wrong mental model of patient state.
If errors are allowed creep into such data, the purpose is defeated. To
prevent such errors there are well studied implementations in informa-
tion theory like Cyclic Redundancy Check codes (CRC) that guarantee
the absence of these errors. Over and above, the workflow can validate
abnormal values and flag them.
• We recognize faults and failures as very similar entities in the semantics
of our safety critical system. Since the system also has the real-time
and distributed properties, we chose to employ a human in the loop
active/standby system incorporating a human in the loop hot swap as
well to add more replica standbys later.
• Our system deals with at most one permanent failure. The system is
heterogeneous with the Medical Order Manager being used for issu-
ing treatment and logging by the nurses and being stateless while the
MainUI+Workflow are operated by doctor and is stateful. We care only
about recovering and failures involved with MainUI. The Fault Toler-
ance manager allows the hot swap of Medical Order Manager at any-
time. Hence we go with the architecture where the Medical Order Man-
ager can potentially become the hot standby for the MainUI+Workflow.
We use the hot swap feature provided by the Fault Tolerance manager
to deploy more replicas as need arises.
• Regarding Transient or Intermittent failures which we deal together as
partial failure scenarios, Our low complexity safety critical architecture
requires us to avoid dealing with specific partial failures. We will touch
base on this in the later sections.
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3.1.2 Reliability Engineering and Analysis
Software Reliability Engineering is the practice of monitoring and managing
the reliability of a system. By collecting fault, error, and failure statistics
during development, testing, and field operation, monitoring and managing
the parameters of reliability and availability is possible. The Handbook of
Software Reliability Engineering[19] contains a number of articles on topics
related to Software Reliability Engineering. A useful reliability testing tech-
nique is Reliability Growth Modeling, which graphs the cumulative number
of faults corrected versus time. Prediction methods calculate the cumulative
number of faults expected, which enables comparison with the measured re-
sults. This, in turn, enables the determination of the number of faults remain-
ing in the system. Another widely used technique for predicting the reliability
of a system is Markov modeling. These models enable analysis of redun-
dancy techniques and prediction of MTTF1.Markov models are constructed
by defining the possible system states. Transitions between the states are
defined and are assigned a probability factor. The probability indicates the
likelihood that the transition will occur. An important aspect of the model is
that the probability of a state transition depends only on the current state;
history is not considered. Below fig shows a simple Markov model for a duplex
system in which either system may fail with probability (λ) and be restored
to service with probability (µ) and a coverage factor c. The failure rate, (λ) ,
is the inverse of the MTTF, and the repair rate ,(µ), is the inverse of MTTR2.
1Mean Time To Fail
2Mean Time To Repair
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3.1.3 Low Complexity Requirement and the Fail-Fast Model
Complexity analysis is wide spread in algorithm design as well as software
system design. In very basic terms, if we compare two programs of same
size, the one with more decision-making statements will be more complex
as the control of program jumps frequently. From this basic definition to
more complex metrics like the Cyclomatic Complexity Number(CCN) and
corresponding Complexity Adjustment Factors (CAFs), there are in depth
studies to understand complexity. There are various benefits of having low
complexity. We will touch on some that are relevant to our cause. For a
safety critical system, design verification as well as source code verification
of the fault tolerance manager is very essential. Being able to say that our
system can be model checked and simulate faults enables us to create better
system designs. Low Complexity systems have this added advantage of be-
ing easier to verify as well as providing backward compatibility on updated
software version. To achieve this we incorporate the fail fast model. Under
the traditional development model,making your software robust by working
around problems automatically and setting up fail safe assertions leads to
the software ’failing slowly’. The program continues working right after an
error but fails in strange ways later on. The Fail-Fast paradigm addresses
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partial failure tolerance from the viewpoint of design complexity. Under this
model, when a partial failure scenario is encountered, the system fails imme-
diately, visibly and quickly. Failing fast is a non-intuitive technique : ’failing
immediately and visibly’ sounds like it would make your software more frag-
ile, but it actually makes it more robust. Bugs are easier to find and fix, so
fewer go into production. In safety critical aspects its all the more important
to know exactly in what scenario the system would fail. Doing away with
partial failures, not only helps us avoid the state space explosion problem
which makes verification a difficult aspect of the module, but also makes the
software development phase more robust minimizing the iterative needs of
deploying hot fixes once in production. It also helps avoid unexpected corner
case behaviors that traditional testing and quality assurance practices do not
catch.
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3.2 System Requirements
While setting out to build our fault tolerance strategy, we need to first list
out the requirements for our system.
1. Failure Detection:
• Failure detector should be pessimistic. By pessimistic we mean, it
may permitted to mis-predict a currently ’up’ process to be failed
due to reasons like message latencies(especially in Asynchronous
communication between Medical Order Manager and Main UI).
• Failure detector should be complete. This is a more important
factor than accuracy since you expect every failure to be caught.
• Heartbeat channel should be independent of Messaging Channel-
In our system we separate the functional message passing between
Medical Order Manager and Main UI by introducing a indepen-
dent third component on each of devices capable of monitoring
each of the processes. Hence it is essential that the heartbeat chan-
nel remains decoupled from the messaging channel.
• Intra Device Heartbeat- Another feature of the Failure detec-
tor which applies to partial failure is to be able to tell if indi-
vidual software components/processes (Main UI/Workflow Man-
ager/Medical Order Manager) monitored by the Fault Tolerance
Manager stop responding. For this purpose the Fault Tolerance
Manager maintains a internal heartbeat of each of the compo-
nents. We address this in the next section.
2. Reliable Wired vs unreliable Wireless network and input consistency.
3. State:
• Stable state storage: Our crash recovery model is based to ability
to recover from a saved state. This requires the process to log their
state after every action. There is necessity for these operations to
be atomic which we will call as a stable storage operation. We place
some restrictions for example, the medical order manager should
not process cannot store a variable in stable storage and then send
a message or issue an external output in a single atomic step. This
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restriction is guiding principle and requirement for building each
stateful component that operate with Fault Tolerance Manager.
• State Sync: The state of the various processes should be recov-
erable the stable storage. Towards this end, the Fault tolerance
manager should be periodically be able to sync the state of sys-
tem from one device to another enabling crash recovery.
4. Misc Monitoring Functionality: In close relation to the state sync, the
Fault tolerance manager should be able to attribute the following func-
tionality
• Ability to Manually start/restart one or more processes on the
device.
• Ability to Manually terminate one or more processes on the device.
• Ability to Manually sync the state across the Active Device and
Standby device.
• Ability to Automatically restart one or more processes upon fail-
ure and restore state in case we are dealing with partial failures3.
5. Verification requirement: The fault tolerance manager model should be
verifiable.
In the next section we will see how each of these requirements are satisfied.
3Note: we choose not to deal with partial failures as we shall see in the later sections
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3.3 System Overview & Design
The fault tolerance manager is the central service running on the distributed
components of the resuscitation system. Reliable continuous operation of our
system is crucial for safety critical requirements. The fault tolerance manager
ensures to satisfy QOS requirements for our system.
The Fault Tolerance Manager attributes the following functions in its imple-
mentation:
• Heartbeat
Heartbeat failure detectors and Heartbeat messages are a widely ac-
cepted method of checking if all the functioning components of the
system are alive or not. The Fault tolerance manager has a built in
heartbeat detector that detects the up-time for each component and
upon failure invokes the recovery module.
Heartbeating ensures two properties of the system[20]:
– Proof of liveliness property: Between our two Fault Tolerance
Manager Processes, each process p i receives a HEARTBEAT mes-
sage, upon receipt of which it increments the sequence in its own
book keeping (could be as simple as maintaining a hash table or
array with suitable inputs). If the heartbeat refuses to increase for
the TIMEOUT period, the detector marks the process as failed
and executes recovery routine.
– Proof of completeness property: In the safety critical environment,
we cannot leave things to chance. Once a process is suspected
of failure(whether it be device failure or latency in heartbeats),
the process is marked failed. Hence we avoid missing failure by
being over zealous in our definition of what is assumed to be failed
satisfying the completeness property i.e. all failures are potentially
detected.
The heartbeating property is verifiable using our UPPAAL model sat-
isfying the verification requirement. Moreover, the heartbeat channel
is independent of fault tolerance satisfying our other requirement men-
tioned in 3.2.
• Control Messages
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The Fault Tolerance manager adds a layer of messaging between other
similarly functioning managers in other components, that helps process
control messages such as ’System Init’ and ’Start Recovery’.
• Process Control
The Fault tolerance manager has complete control of the various pro-
cesses and services running within the device, enabling it to check status
of every process and issue suitable actions. For ex: When it detects a
process is hung, it can either send out a control message to enable recov-
ery or kill the hung process and restart it with suitable configuration.
To implement this feature we have the following four checks:
1. Internal Heartbeat of each process with the Fault Tolerance Man-
ager. This could potentially detect partial failure but we treat
them as a complete failure to avoid verification overhead.
2. The Process.Responding [21] windows API call will indicate if a
process that is executing a windows message loop is responding or
not.
3. Poll the memory usage for the process at intervals and if it doesn’t
change after enough time, assume that it is hung. One can do
this with Process.WorkingSet64 API[22]. The drawback for this
method is it can generate false negatives which is compliant with
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our completeness requirement for safety critical systems4.
• State Integrity Check
A critical aspect of state recovery in the Active/Standby model is that
the state recovered must be sane5. The fault tolerance manager incor-
porates validations(syntactic) that ensures the recovered state is not
gibberish. Further human in the loop validation is necessary to check
the semantics. Hence it helps in rollback/crash recovery.
• State Transfer
1. The Fault tolerance manager also attributes the periodic syncing
of state and logs from the active system to the standby system
over the wireless network. This state transfer channel operates
on the same channel as the control messaging channel which is
independent of the Application messaging channel and heartbeat
channel.
2. Since above network communication is wireless,it adds a certain
aspect of unreliability.to mitigate this, we add the writing of the
logs to a stable storage using atomic operations. This stable stor-
age in our system is a flash based plug and play storage that can be
introduced to the standby system upon resumption. The required
software hooks on the standby side would prioritize this over the
network relayed state. The state integrity checker should be ca-
pable of picking up the newer version based on the timestamps in
the logs 6.
3. Input consistency management:Though this is not available in the
current implication. The standby system can potentially have a
buffer that serializes messages with a sequence number. A missed
message is cached (i.e if the system sees a application layer mes-
sage sequence ’n’ and then one that’s greater than ’n+1’, it caches
it in the buffer) and flushed accordingly. At present we rely on the
human operator to catch any missed messages.
4Better safe than sorry
5In context of quality assurance sanity check
6This helps the standby come up to speed and handle any messaging latencies caused
during the state transfer
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3.3.1 System Launch Flow
7
7Mom is Medical Order Manager
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3.4 Verification
3.4.1 Introduction
Testing and verification are essential to the creation of fault tolerant com-
puting systems because they ensure that fault prevention and quality efforts
are successful. Testing and verification also provide the data needed by a
projects software reliability engineers to compute the expected reliability of
a system.
A useful kind of testing for fault tolerant systems is operational profile test-
ing. An operational profile describes the usage of the system in quantitative
terms and the most typical scenarios that the system will process. This infor-
mation helps define the most appropriate tests to be run, and how to focus
testing efforts. Operational profiles are the scenarios that are used in design,
development, and test. To test the reliability and performance of the system
the operational profile adds quantitative information to the descriptions of
typical scenarios
Software fault insertion testing is done by providing erroneous inputs to the
system. One way is to alter the normal input to determine the systems be-
havior to incorrect values. This is commonly called boundary testing. The
next level beyond this is to place hooks into the software, or use a debugging
tool, to enable internal values and state to be altered. Testers insert known
faults into the system and the systems behavior is monitored. This testing
serves the dual purpose of identifying faults in the systems error handling
processes and of providing data for the computation of coverage factors. Fault
insertion testing is the only way that a systems coverage factor can be deter-
mined8. Known faults are introduced into the system, which is then observed
to see if the system was able to handle the faults automatically. We explore
each of these aspects bundled with model checking using the UPPAAL model
checking tool.
8The coverage is computed as the percentage of cases in which recovery was successful
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3.4.2 On Distributed Systems
Distributed systems have proven to be hard to understand, design, and reason
about due to their complexity and non-deterministic nature. They usually
involve subtle interactions of a number of components that have high level of
parallelism. This is why the correctness of these systems is difficult to ensure.
Several systems and protocols have been proven not to succeed in satisfying
their intended goals after they have been published[23]. One of the promising
solutions to this problem is the use of formal verification techniques such as
the model checking technique.
3.4.3 Verification nuances of the Fault Tolerance Manager
We use the model checking tool UPPAAL to generate timed automaton
model of our system. UPPAAL enables us to do a myriad of verification
profiles.
Simplified Model:
In the above model we have three components whose behavior is mirrored
based on the source code of the Fault Tolerance Manager. The communica-
tion network model can be tweaked to give us various failure testing scenarios
and simulate recovery.
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The evaluation environment is shown in 3.1
Model Checker UPPAAL 4.1.20
Processor Intel I7
RAM 16 GB
Metrics Deadlocks,State space con-
sumed and verification time
Table 3.1: Evaluation environment
Components Modelled:
• Instance of Primary(Active)
• Instance of Secondary(Standby)
• Communication Network
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Figure 3.1: Time series operational snapshot of Model
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As depicted in 3.1, under normal operation, the states remain in(
Operational norm, Operational norm
)
and periodically enter the state
transfer phase
(
syncingLog, syncingProcess
)
. rMsq start is one of the
control messages that allows the system to launch as per a certain required
configuration ensuring synchronization. When heart beating fails, each of the
instance can enter ’SoloInit’ state and recover its state from the logs and en-
ter ’RecoveryMode’.
We have verified the system to be deadlock free and correctly operational
under simulated message packet drops in the communication model.
To simulate packet drops, we use probabilistic chance
(
state transitions
)
of
messages being dropped by controlling weights in the communication chan-
nel model. This essentially acts as a black box and we can completely take
down the channel at run time by parsing an array of inputs processed at
different time slices. We can also verify out of order messages to simulate
effect of latencies and our model
(
and in turn the source code
)
is capable of
handling such inputs. Complete device failure is simulated as subset of the
communication model failure since we do not deal with partial system failure
under our fast fail design.
More information on various testing profiles are tabulated in Appendix A.
More information on the verified UPPAAL Properties are tabulated in Ap-
pendix B.
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3.5 Iterative Design: Combining Testing & Model
Checking
Our initial few testing suites and UPPAAL models revealed several flaws in
the source code implementations. The following list is not exhaustive but is
exemplary of some of bugs that we were able to catch at early testing stages
and fix.
1. Race Conditions
It is interesting to note that the Fault Tolerance manager handles in-
teraction between three distinct independent components of the system
that we described in section 1.1. It also provides a process control and
monitoring framework. When such loosely coupled systems interact,you
end up encountering race conditions. Our initial testing environment
helped us detect these race conditions and enabled us to add suitable
synchronization routine to help avoid race conditions. Here is a specific
scenario:
(a) Medical Order Managers attempts to communicate with the Main
UI with either the Main UI/Workflow not already running or run-
ning with misconfiguration. Upon detecting this design flaw, the
Fault Tolerance Manager was tweaked to incorporate a Control
Messaging Channel that would enable message passing between
the distributed FM9 entities and add a acknowledgement based
synchronization design into the system. This also makes each in-
stance of our system more stateful, helping the model checking
phase of the project10,11 .
(b) Our synchronization routine ensures that the Main UI and Work-
flow are connected before the Medical Order Manager connects.
2. Deadlocks
The initial few UPPAAL model based on the first few implementations
revealed several deadlocks in our system which we first fixed in the UP-
PAAL model and then extended the same design principle to the Fault
9FM short for Fault Tolerance Manager
10The revised architecture helps us create the UPPAAL model more intuitively
11Again the modelling semantics of UPPAAL alone would not help us catch this since
UPPAAL models by their very nature highly synchronous
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Tolerance Manager source code. These deadlocks were rarely encoun-
tered during the testing phase. In safety critical systems it is essential
to be able to say ”NO” with high confidence. Thus an exhaustive state
space exploration via UPPAAL is one good way to do so which is what
we strive to achieve.
3. Towards real world communication networks
Our initial UPPAAL model did not model communication layer unreli-
ability as in the case with real-world wireless networks. We hence added
another component to probabilistically be able to simulate packet losses.
This component also enabled us to externally control input to each of
the instances.This is very powerful as it enabled us to manually insert
erroneous inputs and check the behavior of the system.
Hence this iterative design strategy helped both ways i.e. the UPPAAL model
helped in improvement of the source of implementation and understanding
the nature of the source code helped us improve the UPPAAL model. This ap-
proach essentially serves like a feedback control system improving the systems
overall design and implementation qualitatively. All of the above mentioned
design principles are not confined to our system alone. Our team is already
working on a general purpose system capable of handling other medical sce-
narios like Sepsis or critical care during patient transport and hope to follow
similar guidelines for their Fault Tolerance Strategy. In this futuristic world
that has started to move towards autonomous robotic systems such as self
driving cars, advanced avionics and even simple devices such as autonomous
vacuum cleaners, there will always be scope for a Fault Tolerance Manager.
We strive to create some best practice design principles that is generic enough
to apply to each of these field and our iterative testing/modelling approach
would also be advantageous to ensure error free design.
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3.6 Future Work
1. In the current work, the implementation is specific to the Resuscitation
System. There scope to improve on this and make it generic enough to
be able to extend it and make it reusable towards other allied situation
awareness systems like the Sepsis System.
2. In the current system, the period of operation is in no way a limiting
factor as per design12. However, the reliability testing and the verifi-
cation model are time sensitive entities and might require additional
changes and modifications.
3. From a Software Engineering Effort aspect, a good update to have is to
be able to pickup testing scenarios via configuration files. In Software
Engineering there is a practice known as Continuous Integration Test-
ing. In this practice, every time a software modification is done, the
testing and verification suites are automatically triggered and re-run.
To enable such features later in the project encoding test cases into
configuration files would be very helpful.
4. We mentioned the Reliability Growth Modeling and Markov modelling
techniques for reliability testing in 3.1.2. There is potential to incor-
porate such testing strategies into our current implementation thereby
enabling us to make stronger claims of robustness and fault tolerance.
5. There is scope to improve the User Interface Design of the Fault Tol-
erance Manager. The current design is not tested against usability and
is purely functional in nature.
12Clinical procedures like resuscitation span minutes while treatment for severe sepsis
can span weeks
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In closing,this document gives a brief summary of my contribution towards
two essential components of the resuscitating project. A lot of the imple-
mentation details are beyond the scope of this document and the respective
documentation of each module can be found on the subversion host repository
of the project1. Both the Workflow Manager and Fault Tolerance Manager
strive to be low complexity entities that are verifiable as well as adhere to
design principles necessary in building safety critical systems.I am grateful
and delighted to have been presented with the opportunity to work on them
by Prof. Lui Sha who has guided me along every step.
1http://mdpnp.cs.illinois.edu/svn/ResuscitationProject/
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APPENDIX A TEST SUITES
Testing ID Description Expected Result
SystemInit
1. Start the Fault Toler-
ance Manager
2. Press ”Start System”
button
1. Main UI, Medical Or-
der Manager, Workflow
Manager starts
2. These three programs
connects successfully
3. Heartbeat is available
on both the devices
ManStartProg
1. Start the Fault Toler-
ance Manager
2. • Press the Start
MainUI Only but-
ton
• Press the Start
Workflow Only
• Press the Start
MOM Only
1. Main UI starts
2. Workflow Manager
starts
3. Medical Order Manager
starts2
Table A.1
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Testing ID Description Expected Result
ManKillProg
1. Start the Fault Toler-
ance Manager
2. Press ”Start System”
button
3. • Press the Kill
MainUI Only
button
• Press the Kill
Workflow Only
• Press the Kill
MOM Only
1. Main UI Terminates
2. Workflow Manager ter-
minates
3. Medical Order Manager
Terminates3
AutoProgFail
1. Start the Fault Toler-
ance Manager
2. Press ”Start System”
button
3. Kill one of three pro-
grams manually
1. Main UI, Medical Or-
der Manager, Workflow
Manager all start suc-
cessfully on standby
2. These three programs
connects successfully
3. State is recovered from
stable storage
4. Resumption flow is ini-
tiated upon restart
5. Physicians can continue
to operate on stand by
device
Table A.2
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Testing ID Description Expected Result
FTHbFail
1. Start the Fault Toler-
ance Manager
2. Press ”Start System”
button
3. Kill network
1. Main UI, Medical Or-
der Manager, Workflow
Manager all start suc-
cessfully on standby
2. These three programs
connects successfully
3. State is recovered from
stable storage
4. Resumption flow is ini-
tiated upon restart
5. Physicians can continue
to operate on stand by
device
Table A.3
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APPENDIX B VERIFIED PROPERTIES
Type Description
Safety Properties
P1: Medical Order Manager is active utmost on one in-
stance.
P2: WorkFlow Manager is active utmost on one instance
P3: Main UI is active utmost on one device
P4: Fault Tolerance Manager is active on both devices
Protocol properties
P5: There is no deadlock in the system
P6: Control Messages and Heartbeat are on different
communication channels
P7: When Active instance is in OperationalNorm
state(state of normal dual device operation), Standby
instance is also in OperationalNorm state
P8: When Active instance is syncingLog State, Standby
instance is in syncinProgress case and vice versa
P9: If Hearbeat Timeout > 10 units while in any dual
operation states4, either instance would be in SoloInit
state5
P10: Instance would go into RecoveryMode only after
successfully launching all three components
P11: Standby Instance would go into RecoveryMode
state implies previously active instance is in Failed state
and vice versa6
Table B.1
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